Undermining or remodeling: Effects of leadership rotation on the effectiveness of authoritarian environmentalism in China

Abstract

This article examines contradictory arguments regarding the impacts of leadership rotation, ranging from undermining to remodeling, on the effectiveness of Chinese authoritarian environmentalism (AE), by examining the example of Environmental Administrative Inquiry (EAI) regulation, which inherently indicates the accountability-enhanced, outcome-driven transformation of Chinese AE in recent years. Empirical results reveal an overall positive and significant environmental effect over a year after EAI practice came into effect. This effect is more valid and stable in magnitude the more EAI is implemented. Further analysis demonstrates that, among EAI-treated municipal governors, those who are rotated from outside the jurisdiction (especially those assigned from superior hierarchies) or who have short tenures tend to achieve quick and lasting environmental outcomes. These findings indicate that leadership rotation does seem to aid implementation by breaking local interest collusions, reducing coordination problems, and rebuilding ecological government-enterprise relations, all of which increase the advantages of China's model of AE. Policy implications and further understandings of Chinese AE are also discussed.