Undermining Combat Readiness in the Russian Military, 1992-2005

Abstract

Focusing on four critical components of combat cohesion—leadership, morale, trust, and training—the author argues that under Boris Yeltsin, combat cohesion deteriorated to the point where the Russian military was not in a position to carry out combat operations—as demonstrated by the army’s poor showing in the First Chechen War. As a result, the military that Putin inherited was in shambles. Planes were not flying, ships were not sailing, and soldiers were not training. While the outcome is not assured, Putin has provided the generals with the two factors they value the most: stability and predictability. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the steep decline in combat readiness has begun to be reversed—even so, success is not assured, and there is a long way to go before Moscow will be able to boast of an army approaching that fielded by the Soviets