Abstract
Compositionality and semantic innocence seem intuitively plausible constraints on a semantic theory. It has, however, proved notoriously difficult to respect both principles within a single framework. In this paper I argue that their apparent incompatibility derives from an overly-strong formulation of the principles. I propose an alternative weaker formulation which allows for both principles to be respected within a single semantic framework while satisfying the intuitions which motivate the two principles.
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