Undercutting Underdetermination‐Based Scepticism

Abstract

AbstractAccording to Duncan Pritchard, there are two kinds of radical sceptical problem; the closure‐based problem, and the underdetermination‐based problem. He argues that distinguishing these two problems leads to a set of desiderata for an anti‐sceptical response, and that the way to meet all of these desiderata is by supplementing a form of Wittgensteinian contextualism (which can undercut the closure‐based problem) with disjunctivist views about factivity (to undercut the underdetermination‐based problem). I agree that an adequate response should meet most of the initial desiderata Pritchard puts forward, and that some version of Wittgensteinian contextualism shows the most promise as a starting point for this, but I argue, contra Pritchard, that the addition of disjunctivism is unnecessary and potentially counter‐productive. If we draw on lessons from Michael Williams's inferential contextualism then it is both possible, and preferable, to meet the most important of Pritchard's desiderata, undercutting both closure‐based and underdetermination‐based sceptical problems in a unified way, without the need to resort to disjunctivism.