Abstract
Discussion of the various aspects of relations between the military and society in Israel has been widespread in social and political science research for many years. The changing character of these relations and, in particular, the weakening of the nation’s army reserve, has attracted special attention recently. The developments of the last twenty years have raised a number of questions, among them vital issues at the heart of Israel’s national security perceptions. A crucial postulate is that, because of the country’s small population, the Israeli military cannot continually maintain its full capacity. Thus, in the case of emergency or war, a small conscript and professional army is expected to defend the front lines and hold back an enemy advance for the time needed (about 48 hours) to deploy the remaining (hundreds of thousands of) reserve soldiers constituting the main force of the military. This concept, which has proven efficient throughout Israel’s military conflicts, is now a matter of concern due to the growing number of citizens no longer taking part in reserve service. Therefore, the very essence of Israel’s security concept is under investigation here. Does Israel still have a large enough reserve army for the actual defence of its borders in times of emergency? In addition, what are the factors which affect the size of this force? The outbreak of terror during the Al-Aqsa Intifada since 2000 has forced Israel to issue immediate draft orders for the first time in almost two decades. Although the threat of terror is in itself considered an important contributor in a soldier’s motivation, many of the reservists called up experienced such orders for the first time in their military careers. This has enabled the testing of established notions under circumstances which have not existed for two decades. This study looks into the factors which explain
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