Under the Concealing Surface: Detecting and Understanding Live Webcams in the Wild

Abstract

Given the central role of webcams in monitoring physical surroundings, it behooves the research community to understand the characteristics of webcams' distribution and their privacy/security implications. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic study on live webcams from both aggregation sites and individual webcams (webpages/IP hosts). We propose a series of efficient, automated techniques for detecting and fingerprinting live webcams. In particular, we leverage distributed algorithms to detect aggregation sites and generate webcam fingerprints by utilizing the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the built-in web server of a device. Overall, we observe 0.85 million webpages from aggregation sites hosting live webcams and 2.2 million live webcams in the public IPv4 space. Our study reveals that aggregation sites have a typical long-tail distribution in hosting live streams (5.8% of sites contain 90.44% of live streaming contents), and 85.4% of aggregation websites scrape webcams from others. Further, we observe that (1) 277,239 webcams from aggregation sites and IP hosts (11.7%) directly expose live streams to the public, (2) aggregation sites expose 187,897 geolocation names and more detailed 23,083 longitude/latitude pairs of webcams, (3) the default usernames and passwords of 38,942 webcams are visible on aggregation sites in plaintext, and (4) 1,237 webcams are detected as having been compromised to conduct malicious behaviors.