Undecidability and opacity of metacognition in animals and humans.

Kevin B Clark,Derrick L Hassert

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00171

Abstract

Undecidability and opacity of metacognition in animals and humans.

Highlights

Psychologists well understand the fallibility of formal logic systems and of axiomatic animal and human psychological processes, including, among other phenomena, feature detection, inferential judgments, error diagnosis and correction, concept formation, memory storage and retrieval, and introspection
Many of us enthusiastic about studying metacognition avoid the strange, looping causality of selfreference exposed with Gödelian numbering to concentrate on solving basic and/or clinical empirical difficulties that arise when trying to identify this stubbornly opaque hypothetical construct of healthy and pathological minds (e.g., Bach and David, 2006; Koren et al, 2006; Vance, 2006; Carruthers, 2009; Gumley, 2011; Brevers et al, 2013)
A case illustrating these three classes of problems is found for Paulus et al (2013), who report evidence of implicit metacognition in normal preschool children performing a paired-associates learning and memory task

Summary

Introduction

Psychologists well understand the fallibility of formal logic systems and of axiomatic animal and human psychological processes, including, among other phenomena, feature detection, inferential judgments, error diagnosis and correction, concept formation, memory storage and retrieval, and introspection (cf. Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Kahneman et al, 1982; Watanabe and Huber, 2006). The operational opacity of metacognition becomes arguably most apparent when considering: (1) poor subjective accessibility to the cognition and metacognition of animals and humans of limited or no language proficiency (cf Hampton, 2009; Fleming and Dolan, 2012; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012; Smith et al, 2012), (2) the synergism and antagonism of unreliable explicit and implicit psychological components that mask real metacognitive abilities and capacities from agent and external observer (cf Hampton, 2009; Fleming et al, 2012), and (3) the occasional independence between metacognition and cognitive skills which may exacerbate the preceding two problems (cf Koriat and Goldsmith, 1998; Schneider, 1999).

Results

Conclusion