Abstract
Abstract Dynamics for play of transferable-utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto-dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non-empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
