Unconventional monetary policy, liquidity trap, and asset prices

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article offers a fundamental critique of monetary policy implemented in the United States following the 2007–8 global financial crisis. It aims to show that the misunderstanding of the mainstream theoretical thinking underlying monetary policy actions led to the ineffectiveness of the policy response to the 2007–8 global financial crisis. The conventional view that monetary policy is the stabilization tool has serious flaws and is ineffective for bringing about economic recovery. The Federal Reserve’s experiment with the so-called unconventional monetary policy exposed the weakness of the conventional belief in understanding how banks operate, how the monetary authority can influence the yield curve, and how the monetary transmission mechanism works, resulting in prescribing an ineffective treatment to boost economic activity. In this regard, it is argued that the Federal Reserve’s decision to let long-term interest rates be market determined represents a significant self-imposed constraint, which limits policy options regarding monetary policy actions and the effective control of long-term interest rates. By limiting the setting of policy rates only to the overnight interest rate, the ability of the monetary authority to influence long-term interest rates is both weak and indirect.