Abstract
The definitions and requirements of normative documents for unanticipated accidents at nuclear power plants with fast reactors are analyzed. Definitions are constructed between one another and with a collection of scenarios which can lead to unanticipated accidents, likewise determined by normative documents independently of the probability of these accidents actually happening. It is concluded that the normative approaches to fast-reactor safety must be refined with respect to strengthening the probabilistic criteria as a tool limiting the list of required unanticipated accidents for validating reactor safety. Special attention is devoted to the need to strengthen the motivation of designers to make the maximum possible use of passively triggered safety systems.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
