UNAMID: a hybrid solution to a human security problem in Darfur?

Abstract

In response to the widespread death, displacement and human insecurity created by the 2003 eruption of conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan, the newly established African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, with its nascent doctrine of ‘non-indifference’ to insecurity inside regional states, initially deployed a small ceasefire monitoring team. The scope of the ongoing crisis in Darfur relative to the mandate and capacity of this AU team led to calls for the deployment of a more substantial UN peace operation with a robust civilian protection mandate, but the Sudanese government, implicated in crimes against the civilian population, rejected a mission of this character. These competing pressures led, in 2007, to the authorisation of the AU–UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), an unprecedented joint peace operation constituted by forces of ‘predominantly African character’, while being largely externally financed and structured by UN command and control and backstopping. Despite some achievements, UNAMID has been beset by significant authority, legitimacy, coordination, logistical and capacity challenges, including that it is yet to reach full deployment levels. This paper argues that UNAMID represents, on the one hand, an important attempt by the evolving AU to play a direct and effective role in regional peace operations, and contains elements of a viable model for other potential hybrid operations on the continent. On the other hand, however, the political compromise with Khartoum has continued to undermine the ability of UNAMID to provide adequate human security for the displaced and vulnerable civilian populations of Darfur.