Abstract
In growing numbers of court cases, neuroscience is presented to document the mental state of the offender at the level of the brain. While a small body of research has documented the effects of describing the brain state of psychotic offenders, this study tested the impact of neuroscience that could apply to far more offenders; that is the neuroscience of impulse control. In this online vignette experiment, 759 participants sentenced a normally controlled or normally impulsive actor, who committed a violent offense on impulse, explained in either cognitive or neurobiological terms. Although participants considered the neurobiological actor less responsible for his impulsive disposition than the cognitive actor, the neuroscientific testimony did not affect attributions of choice, blame, dangerousness, or punishment for the criminal act. In fact, the neuroscientific testimony exacerbated the perception that the offender offended consciously and “really wanted” to offend. The described disposition of the actor was also influential: participants attributed more capacity for reform, more free choice and consequently, more blame to the normally controlled actor. Participants also attributed this actor's offending more to his social life experiences and less to his genes and brain. However, this shift in attributions was unable to explain the greater blame directed at this offender. Together, such findings suggest that even when neuroscience changes attributions for impulsive character, attributions for impulsive offending may remain unchanged. Hence this study casts doubt on the mitigating and aggravating potential of neuroscientific testimony in court.
Highlights
The retributive justification for punishment requires that sentences are tailored to the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the offender (von Hirsch, 1976)
It is traditionally claimed that legal attributions of responsibility reflect the Perceptions of Impulsive Offenders general capacity of the offender to exercise rational choice
The cause of impulsive offending holds retributive significance only when the prior behavior of the offender suggests he lacks a general capacity for self-control; in this context, the lay person may be sensitized to neuroscientific testimony
Summary
The retributive justification for punishment requires that sentences are tailored to the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the offender (von Hirsch, 1976). When the offender is a persistently impulsive actor, participants may be primed to consider the possibility that he lacks the capacity to exercise self-control In this context, people may be sensitized to further capacity cues, such as neuroscientific evidence of impulsivity. It was hypothesized that the effect of neuroscientific testimony would be restricted to judgements of the normally impulsive actor: H2: Participants would be more likely to believe the impulsive offender lacked the capacity (rather than the motivation) to exercise self-control when self-control was described in neurobiological (rather than cognitive) terms. H3: Participants would attribute less “free choice,” fault and punishment to the impulsive actor when self-control was described in neurobiological (rather than cognitive) terms These three hypotheses predict that, contrary to the claims of Greene and Cohen (2004), there is no gap between the intuitive and legal response to neuroscience. The cause of impulsive offending holds retributive significance only when the prior behavior of the offender suggests he lacks a general capacity for self-control; in this context, the lay person may be sensitized to neuroscientific testimony
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
