UN Sanctions, Panels of Experts and the Political Economy of Intrastate Conflict

Abstract

United Nations (UN) sanctions have significant potential to complement peacekeeping and mediation by limiting the finances to pay for war and the weapons to wage it, mitigating economic incentives for the perpetuation of conflict and preventing conflict related to public sector corruption. This chapter highlights the principal UN sanctions tools that can be used to tackle the challenges posed by the political economy of intrastate conflict, with a focus on the Panels of Experts (PoEs) that facilitate implementation and report to the Security Council and its sanctions committees. It provides an institutional overview of PoEs, discusses the relationship between PoEs and peace operations, and assesses active UN sanctions regimes and PoEs in relation to contemporary intrastate conflicts. Obstacles to the work of PoEs and thus more effective UN sanctions implementation include operational-level difficulties (i.e. adaptable organised crime networks, war profiteering and enforcement complacency), Security Council politics and practice, and UN institutional factors. The conclusion provides specific recommendations to the General Assembly, the Secretariat and the Security Council for enabling PoEs and suggests reforms that are needed to make UN sanctions more strategically designed, tactically applied and usefully coordinated with peace operations.