Umyślne spowodowanie katastrofy lub jej bezpośredniego niebezpieczeństwa w ruchu drogowym. Kontrowersje wokół kwalifikacji prawnej

Abstract

Causing a catastrophe in road traffic or the direct danger of its occurrence by deliberate misconduct has been a subject of disputes in both judicature and in science. In principle it was excluded that such a catastrophe or its immediate danger might be committed purposefully, with a direct intent, unless it involved a criminal offense, such as a terrorist attack that might consist in a multiple manslaughter, diversion or sabotage. On the other hand, committing the said offenses intentionally, but just with a prospective intent, consisting essentially in the ability of anticipation of the outcome and consenting to it in practice, occurred rarely and has not been excluded but conditioned by occurrence a few factual circumstances that required conducting a reasoning process. This problem is discussed in the hereby article, which presents difficult and controversial issues, occurring not only in the Polish law. It presents the basic issues in the process of recognising the statutory signs of the crime of causing a catastrophe and its immediate danger, the subject matter of the identified offenses, their subject party and the coincidences of the law. It signals the existence of numerous difficulties of evidential nature with regard to determining guilt of a perpetrator who is not always a road user, even though linked with it indirectly. These considerations may be particularly useful for practitioners dealing with such types of crime, including criminal prosecution of traffic accidents.