Ultrasociality and Intersubjectivity.

Abstract

Multidisciplinary studies of evolution are pointing toward an intersubjective understanding of human cognition, belief, and behavior. Contrary to classical views of reason and knowledge, human mental capacity should not be thought of as an individually based tool for independent judgment and logical problem-solving. Instead, key aspects of learning and cognition were likely shaped to facilitate our species' greatest relative advantage from the standpoint of natural selection: large-scale collaboration. Much of what appears to be faulty reasoning or inaccurate belief when viewed at the level of individuals makes more sense when considered in terms of intersubjectivity and group-level processes. Yet, distributed cognition also has shortcomings. Among these is, paradoxically, the propensity toward individualistic understandings of human thinking and behavior. Moreover, our intersubjective thought processes tend to be biased in favor of our in-groups and maintaining existing systems. Taken together, these premises correspond with some of the theoretical underpinnings of community research and social action. Yet, they challenge or complicate others. Further consideration of humans' intersubjective cognition and learning may yield improved results in a variety of practices, including education and efforts to catalyze social and systemic changes.