Abstract
The role of force and threats of violence in international politics has long occupied the thoughts of concerned philosophers, historians, generals, and statesmen. Early speculation of a general nature, however, has been more recently expanded and refined by political and strategic theorists. Most notable are the studies of bargaining techniques and power (Schelling, 1966, 1960; and Young, 1968), patterns of negotiation and problems of communication (Ikl, 1963; Wohlstetter, 1962; and Jervis, 1970), conceptualizations of limitation and escalation (Halperin, 1962; Brodie, 1966; and Kahn, 1968), and theories of coercive diplomacy (George et al., 197 1). Yet despite all the attention of past and contemporary literature on bargaining and coercive techniques, remarkably few have examined one of the most distinctive, interesting, and dangerous of all forms of communication and persuasion in international crises-the ultimatum.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
