Abstract
In wireless sensor networks, terminal devices with restricted cost and size have limited battery life. Meanwhile, these energy-constrained devices are not easy to access, especially when the terminal devices are located in severe environments. To recharge the energy-constrained devices and extend their network service time, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with wireless power chargers are leased by the third-party control center. To incent the participation of UAVs with different charging capabilities and ensure the strategy-proofness of the incentive mechanism, a hidden information based contract theory model, specifically adverse selection, is introduced. By leveraging individual rationality and incentive compatibility, a contract theory based optimization problem is then formulated. After reducing redundant constraints, the optimal contract items are derived by Lagrangian multiplier. Finally, numerical simulation results are implemented to compare the prepared algorithm with three other baselines, which validates the effectiveness of our proposed incentive mechanism.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
