U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980: A Diplomatic Study by P. Peter Sarros

Abstract

Reviewed by: U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980: A Diplomatic Study by P. Peter Sarros Roy Domenico U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980: A Diplomatic Study. By P. Peter Sarros. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. 452 pp. $50.00. Peter Sarros is a retired diplomat who served for five years (1975–1980) as the assistant to America's envoy to the pope, the "Personal Representative of the President to the Holy See." Shortly after he left that position, the United States elevated the office, in 1984, to Embassy status and the "Personal Representative" became the Ambassador. While in Rome, Sarros aided three envoys: Henry Cabot Lodge who served from June 1970 until July 1977, David Walters (July 1977–August 1978), and Robert Wagner (November 1978–January 1981). Sarros begins by describing this work as the story of "… U.S. diplomatic efforts to enlist the power of the pope and Vatican diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives from 1975 to 1980" (ix). The book does this by examining "eleven specific diplomatic encounters" between the U.S. and the Vatican in which Sarros played a role, devoting each chapter to one of these encounters. Most of the chapters deal with the big issues of the late 1970s. Eurocommunism, the Helsinki process, the neutron bomb and [End Page 89] installation of Pershing missiles in Europe, Östpolitik, the Middle East, the Iran hostage situation, and Liberation theology all receive separate discussions. For two of the less obvious topics, Sarros devotes a chapter to the Holy See's attempt to mediate the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina; and another on America's return of the crown of Saint Stephen to Hungary. The reader might approach U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980 as half study and half memoir. With academic training in international relations, Sarros pursued a career mainly in government and played a key diplomatic role as the events in the book took place, frequently recalling them in the first person. His image appears in most of the book's illustrations. If his acknowledgments give any indication; Sarros went to Rome in 1975 with little background in Vatican or Italian affairs. His view of the Holy See is respectful but anchored in Washington; and he betrays at times a rather "wonky" attitude toward his subject, often writing of the "power of the pope." He says, for instance, on page one: "Although the papacy's territorial and temporal power has significantly decreased since 1870, when the Papal States disappeared, the pope's spiritual power has progressively increased." Such lines might give the reader some pause. Sarros tempers his optimism with some cautions—such as Jesuit disagreements with Washington over Central American policy. Still, he concludes that the Hole See in the late 1970s maintained an "overall pro-U.S. foreign policy orientation" (256), something that must be taken with a grain of salt. Particularly troubling was Sarros' discussion of Washington's (ultimately) aborted development of the neutron bomb. Secretary of State Agostino Casaroli did not buy the U.S. argument that the bomb was a "humane" weapon although in the end, Rome did not condemn it "… to some extent, because of deference to U.S. entreaties but also to the Vatican's overarching commitment for 'balance' of armaments in Europe" (128). Did this illustrate a "pro-U.S. foreign policy orientation"? Perhaps this calls for a little skepticism. [End Page 90] Finally, U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980 might have benefitted from more rigorous editing. One encounters typographic errors throughout the book. Cardinal Antonio Samore should be Samorè (46). The great basilica in Venice is San Marco, not San Marcos (20). Sarros refers to an African water shortage as "drought" on one line and a "draught" on the next (13). In his discussion on page 65 of Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer's 1977 letter to the bishop of Ivrea, moreover, Sarros almost repeats himself on page 67. The endnotes constitute a more substantial problem. They are quite extensive and often add significant insight to the argument. Sarros, however, fails here to cite adequately the sources. He presents State Department documents in a novel way, like his endnote...