U.S. immigration policy: the guestworker option revisited.

Abstract

In guestworker programs foreign nationals are admitted into another country on a nonmigrant status with severely curtailed social and limited labor market rights. The duration of stay is always finite and compliance with the terms of the contract are entered through a network of legal arrangements which allow officials in the receiving country a substantial amount of administrative discretion. Pro-guestworker arguments say that the borders cannot be closed, that guestworkers can be substituted for illegal aliens, that guestworkers are better than illegal aliens, and that additional labor benefits the US economy. Those against guestworker programs stress longterm socioeconomic issues rather than short-term economic advantages, saying that guestworker programs are no quick answer for illegal immigration, for domestic labor shortages, or for the US poor population. Guestworker programs, its opponents say, provide short-run economic benefits to a few employers and individuals at the expense of more widespread and longterm socioeconomic costs. They oppose: 1) the concept of admitting foreign workers with restricted rights, 2) the concentration of any negative labor market impacts on already disadvantaged domestic groups, 3) the proliferation of "jobs which Americans won't take," 4) many temporary guests ending up permanent residents, and 5) that exporting workers is as likely to impede as accelerate job-creating economic development in immigration countries. Most economists believe that diminishing marginal productivity produces downward-sloping short-run demand for labor schedules. The European experience with these programs has been different than those in the US since foreign workers in Europe were initially recruited in response to actual labor shortages and have always had legal status, but both Europe and the US have experienced large contingents of workers who remain in the countries and are at a pronounced power disadvantage regarding the society's institutions. Studies of guestworker programs have shown that worker flows eventually become impervious to the receiver's actual labor needs as employers disaggregate jobs into components which match the low skills of migrants and create additional foreign worker jobs which are then shunned by native labor, thus perpetuating a need for such labor. If the US opts for a large-scale guestworker program this will only replace 1 set of problems with another and it is not at all certain that large-scale guestworker admissions will proportionately reduce illegal migration inflows.