U.S. and Soviet Policies towards France’s Struggle with Anticolonial Nationalism in North Africa

Abstract

Decolonization of French North Africa in the aftermath of WW II confronted the United States and the Soviet Union with a formidable dilemma. For dissimilar reasons both needed to maintain good relations with France. For the U.S., preserving the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance was paramount, whereas for the U.S.S.R eliciting French support in countering the rearmament of Germany and its integration into NATO was of greater importance than endorsing the cause of the Maghrebi nationalists. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. ended up sanctioning the preservation of French presence for fear that the power vacuum would help the rival superpower establish its hegemony in the region. Yet, while both sought to appease France, they also wished to gain the friendship of the nationalist movements opposed to it. Whilst the Soviets sought to prevent the nationalists from being swayed by the western bloc, Americans endeavoured to move them towards self-rule under western leadership to guarantee the establishment of moderate regimes amenable to the west. As a consequence, in order to achieve their respective objectives, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R ended up pursuing similar policies aiming at reconciling contradictory goals to protect their strategic, political, and economic interests. The Algerian war of independence created the greatest challenge to the Americans and the Soviets. America’s Eurocentric approach to decolonization proved detrimental because constant support for France during the Algerian war without any fundamental shift in policy towards the nationalists, even when the outcome had already been decided, allowed the Soviets, who provided material and political backing, to succeed in establishing close ties with postindependence Algeria. This article, based on recently declassified material, analyses the policies of both superpowers and highlights the predicament they faced in dealing with decolonization. Further, it fills the conspicuous gap in the literature on the roles played by the superpowers in the Maghreb region after WW II.