Abstract
This paper provides evidence on US airlines’ responses to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) mandated disclosure of non-financial performance. We find that while all three DOT measures are associated with customer complaints, airlines are more likely to improve on-time performance rather than mishandled bags and ticket over-sales following poor prior period performance. We also find that on-time performance is the only DOT measure that is associated with future accounting performance and is significantly associated with CEO compensation after controlling for financial performance and load factor. We also provide preliminary results to show that airlines incorporate the more informative component of the on-time measure in CEO compensation. Overall, we provide new understanding of how organizations react to the disclosure of non-financial performance and use incentives to improve these measures.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
