Abstract
This paper focuses on the cognitive processes involved in the comprehension of metaphors. It builds on current studies in cognitive linguistics by proposing an amendment to the theoretical idea that there are two routes for comprehending metaphors. It presents an account which is underlined by concept adjustment in all types of metaphorical instances, with the only difference being in the degree of the inferences that it requires. In this paper I claim that a conscious level of processing is involved in the comprehension of some metaphors in order to determine the speaker’s meaning. I ground my discussion squarely in the distinction between types of inferences developed by Mercier and Sperber (2017).
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