Two-Timescale Algorithms for Learning Nash Equilibria in General-Sum Stochastic Games

Abstract

We consider the problem of finding stationary Nash equilibria (NE) in a finite discounted general-sum stochastic game. We first generalize a non-linear optimization problem from [9] to a general N-player game setting. Next, we break down the optimization problem into simpler sub-problems that ensure there is no Bellman error for a given state and an agent. We then provide a characterization of solution points of these sub-problems that correspond to Nash equilibria of the underlying game and for this purpose, we derive a set of necessary and sufficient SG-SP (Stochastic Game - Sub-Problem) conditions. Using these conditions, we develop two provably convergent algorithms. The first algorithm - OFF-SGSP - is centralized and model-based, i.e., it assumes complete information of the game. The second algorithm - ON-SGSP - is an online model-free algorithm. We establish that both algorithms converge, in self-play, to the equilibria of a certain ordinary differential equation (ODE), whose stable limit points coincide with stationary NE of the underlying general-sum stochastic game. On a single state non-generic game [12] as well as on a synthetic two-player game setup with 810,000 states, we establish that ON-SGSP consistently outperforms NashQ [16] and FFQ [21] algorithms.