Abstract
Advertisement recommendation service provides consumers with relevant product information and plays a guiding role when consumers search and buy products. However, some misleading advertisements are recommended to consumers for purpose of stimulating their purchasing desire. This paper investigates a problem in the field of two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation, and a tripartite game model is established to analyze the relationship among the government, the rent-seeking platform, and the misleading advertiser. In addition, we explore the government supervision strategies and examine the effects of the penalty on the probability of publishing misleading advertisements. Then we further discuss how supervision costs and speculation profits impact the probably of supervision and rent-seeking separately. Moreover, numerical examples are given to validate the correctness of the conclusion. Finally, the article proposes some related suggestions for improving advertisement recommendation service regulation, thus offer feasible countermeasures to current government supervisory policy.
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