Abstract
This is the penultimate version of a paper originally presented at the conference, 'Value, Respect and Well-Being: Themes from the work of Joseph Raz,' held at the Manchester Centre for Political Theory in May 2008. The paper explores two problems about the familiar ideal of respect for persons. First, how can we explain respect as a distinct moral and political duty? Second, how can we contain unreasonable demands that we respect other's views or allegiances as necessary aspects of respecting them as persons? The problem is approached by testing some of the leading arguments in Joseph Raz's Seeley Lectures. It has been lightly revised in light of comments received from those thanked in the note.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
