Two Views of Emotional Perception: Some Empirical Suggestions

Abstract

One stream in contemporary philosophical and psychological study of the emotions argues that they are perceptual capacities (e.g., Prinz 2004). For instance, Jesse Prinz has recently defended the view that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes and, via these, of “core relational themes” (2004, 224-25). Core relational themes are, roughly, relations an individual has to his/her environment that pertain to that individual's welfare (2004, 15-16). The present project is to compare and contrast two possible models of emotional perception. The central difference between these models is the notion of modularity that they use, and the corresponding overall view of the nature of the mind. I will suggest some empirical tests that might adjudicate between these different kinds of emotional modularity, and hence between these two models of emotional perception. I will conclude with some remarks about the extent of the relevance of this issue.