Abstract

In his article ‘In Defence of Penalizing (but not Punishing) Civil Disobedience’, David Lefkowitz (2017) neatly maps out the differences between his and my defences of the moral right to civil disobedience. We disagree, first, about its grounds and, second, about its scope. Concerning the grounds, I argue that the right to civil disobedience is grounded in people’s rights to freedom of expression and conscientious action. By contrast, Lefkowitz, like Raz (1979) and others, argues that it is grounded in people’s political participation rights, that is, broadly, their rights to have an equal say over lawmaking. Concerning the scope, I argue that the right to civil disobedience provides people with defeasible normative protection against all forms of state interference with their acts of civil disobedience including penalisation. By contrast, Lefkowitz argues that the right protects against punishment, but not against penalisation for civil disobedience. Let me take each disagreement in turn. With respect to the grounds, Lefkowitz and I might try to call a truce and agree that, like many other rights, the right to civil disobedience is grounded in a plurality of values and interests.

Highlights

  • In his article ‘In Defence of Penalizing Civil Disobedience’, David Lefkowitz (2017) neatly maps out the differences between his and my defences of the moral right to civil disobedience

  • Lefkowitz, like Raz (1979) and others, argues that it is grounded in people’s political participation rights, that is, broadly, their rights to have an equal say over lawmaking

  • It gives a moral right to civil disobedience only to people who live in an illiberal regime, are denied adequate participation rights, and must reclaim those rights from their regime through civil disobedience

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Summary

Introduction

In his article ‘In Defence of Penalizing (but not Punishing) Civil Disobedience’, David Lefkowitz (2017) neatly maps out the differences between his and my defences of the moral right to civil disobedience. He argues that people living in a liberal regime can have a moral right to civil disobedience, but only when they wind up in the minority on a given issue and must work against the bad luck of having fewer resources and insufficient time to persuade people before decisions are made.

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