Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to compare the rate of rent dissipation in a group rent-seeking contest in which rent seeking activities take place in two stages with those of a one-stage individual contest. Specifically, the effect of the extension by introducing rent-seekers with negatively interdependent preferences is analyzed. Focusing on the relationship between contest-structure and preference-type, we find that rent dissipation given absolute, as opposed to relative payoff maximization, is lower in a two-stage contest than in a one-stage contest. Given players with negatively interdependent preferences, we find the reverse.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
