Two-Sided Matching in the Job Market for Assistant Professors in Marketing

Abstract

In the job market for entry-level assistant professors in marketing, hiring departments and job candidates jointly determine the final market outcome - who matches with whom. In this work, we investigate the effects of research field, research productivity and ranking status on these matching outcomes. This is accomplished by estimating a structural two-sided matching model that uncovers the joint productivity, or matching value, of the matches between departments and candidates. Our results show that a match between a candidate trained in a particular research field and a department with similarly trained faculty does not always generate the highest value. Moreover, publications in top marketing journals are most valuable in matches that involve top-ranked departments. However, this effect is moderated by the candidate’s field of research as well as the ranking of his or her degree-granting department. Finally, matches between top-ranked hiring departments and candidates from top-ranked degree-granting departments generate especially high matching value, suggesting that academic stratification exists within marketing academia. These insights are useful for candidates and departments in improving their matching outcomes in the entry-level job market.