Two-sided legitimation strategies: informal groups at the World Trade Organization

Abstract

Abstract Who engages in legitimation strategies in global governance and why and how do they do it? This article studies the legitimation strategies and legitimacy-generating capacity of low-authority institutions, specifically informal groups within formal international organizations (IOs). It argues that informal groups seek legitimation and they can also be a source of legitimation for formal IOs. In doing so, the article makes three contributions to recent legitimation literature: 1) contra recent arguments, it shows why not only high-authority, but also low-authority institutions have special incentives to engage in legitimation; 2) it expands our understanding of the reasons why institutions engage in legitimation, showing why authority-deficits can motivate legitimation; 3) it studies legitimation strategies to show when they are likely to be audience- or agent-driven. A case-study of informal groups at the World Trade Organization yields three policy implications. First, developing countries could invest greater resources in legitimizing informal groups in order to boost their representation and voice opportunities within IOs. Second, formal IOs can increase their own legitimacy by supporting informal groups that enhance the representation of marginalized members. Third, however, to the extent that these strategies deflect pressure for formal rule changes, increasing investments in informal groups may be a long-term liability for developing countries.