Abstract
In a two-sided coalitional matching problem agents on each side of the market simultaneously form coalitions which then are matched to coalitions from the other market side. We assume that each agent has preferences over groups on his own market side and over groups on the opposite market side. These preferences are combined lexicographically as to examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings.
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