Abstract
Abstract The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.
Highlights
The question of what we should believe is central to the ethics of belief
The key word here is “sufficiently”. It makes this characterization of epistemic rationality different from the evidentialist one we considered so far: Evidentialism about Epistemic Rationality Broad Epistemic Rationality
4 Traditional Pragmatism and Pragmatic Encroachment Discussion. Both pragmatisms argue that practical considerations are relevant to settle the central question of the ethics of belief: which doxastic attitude we should have
Summary
The question of what we should believe is central to the ethics of belief. This question can be broadened to other doxastic attitudes such as disbelief and suspension of judgment and it has been specified in the following ways: what is the rational doxastic attitude we should adopt? What are the reasons to adopt a specific doxastic attitude?. Evidentialists claim that the rationality of one’s belief is determined by evidence only On this view, non-evidential considerations do not contribute to the rationality of one’s doxastic attitude.. Evidentialism faces two challenges of pragmatist inspiration Both challenges state that practical considerations can be relevant to determine which doxastic attitude we should adopt. To have a first grasp on the distinction between both types of pragmatism, it is important to note that the central question of the ethics of belief is ambiguous between an epistemic, a practical, and an all-things-considered sense of “should”. Traditional pragmatism does not think that epistemic rationality is the relevant type of rationality when it comes to decide which doxastic attitude we should adopt.
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