Two Objections to the Eliminativist Research Program

Lorenzo Nericcio

doi:10.7710/2155-4838.1161

Abstract

Eliminative materialist philosophers, like Paul and Patricia Churchland, argue that the common use of mental state language is confused. They hold that neurological descriptions of mental states, more accurate and scientifically rigorous than “folk psychology”, should replace mental state language in a serious research program. In this paper, I argue that eliminative materialism instead poses an awkward and unwieldy research program. I take a computational functionalist position in order to demonstrate the way that mathematical descriptions of natural phenomena are useful in a scientific research program, and that mental states are in principle amenable to mathematical descriptions and modeling. I then argue that the eliminativist cannot avail herself of the same resources.

Highlights

The eliminative materialist maintains that the use of “mental talk,” such as refers to mental states as identifiable entities or processes, is fundamentally confused
As any good physicalist will reduce a mental state to its correspondent brain state anyway, a stronger science will not refer to loosely defined and essentially private reports of mental states at all—let alone attempt to reduce them
I will argue that mental states equal the causal roles and computational states they occupy; the same mental state instantiated in two different media is the same so long as the functional role and computational state is the same

Summary

Introduction

The eliminative materialist maintains that the use of “mental talk,” such as refers to mental states as identifiable entities or processes, is fundamentally confused She holds that, as any good physicalist will reduce a mental state to its correspondent brain state anyway, a stronger science will not refer to loosely defined and essentially private reports of mental states at all—let alone attempt to reduce them. The germ theorist applies her theory and finds that it allows for tremendous predictive success, and so it is very likely that the entities, germs, quantified over by the theory exist – and that witches do not It is, says the eliminativist, with mental states and neurological states.

The Computational Model

Problems for the Eliminativist

Concluding Remarks