Abstract

These people show a spirit and conduct against us they never showed against the French, and everybody has judged of them from their former appearance and behaviour when joined with the King's forces in the last war [Seven Years' War, 1756–63] … They are now spirited up by a rage and enthusiasm as great as ever people were possessed of and you must proceed in earnest or give the business up. A small body acting in one spot will not avail, you must have large armies making diversions on different sides, to divide their force. The loss we have sustained is greater than we can bear. Small armies can't afford such losses, especially when the advantage gained tends to little more than the gaining of a post. General Gage, British Commander-in-Chief in North America, to the Secretary at War, after the battle of Bunker Hill, 1775. If the origins of modern war are being sought, then attention tends to focus on these two conflicts. Thus, for example, the Arnold Modern Wars series began with Stephen Conway's study, The War of American Independence 1775–1783 (1995). The conflict is presented as a Revolutionary war whose “defining characteristics are those of modern warfare … The real innovation was the first appearance, on a significant scale, of a people's war”. This argument is then amplified for the French Revolutionary Wars, which broke out in 1792.

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