Abstract

AbstractWhen arguing for rights for robots, many theorists draw analogies between robots, on the one hand, and humans and other animals, on the other. They use these analogies to support the extension of rights beyond humans and other animals to robots. In this paper I argue that, even if we are initially inclined to see existing analogies between robots and humans and other animals as reasons for granting robots moral consideration, there are two rarely noted significant features that threaten to disrupt these analogies: uniqueness and completeness. I argue that those potential disrupters have a negative impact on many arguments from analogy regarding robot rights.

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