Two Dimensions of Moral Cognition as Correlates of Different Forms of Participation in Bullying.

Simona C S Caravita,Johannes N Finne,Hildegunn Fandrem

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.768503

Simona C S Caravita, Johannes N Finne + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.768503

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Abstract

The present study investigated the extent to which moral disengagement and the tendency to consider moral rules as socio-conventional rules are distinct dimensions of morality, and their association with three different forms of participation in bullying (perpetrating bullying, defending the victim and passive bystander behavior). These two types of moral cognitions have been theorized in different models of morality and are usually studied independently, even if research on moral shifts (the interpretation of a moral rule transgression as a socio-conventional rule transgression) suggests some possible overlaps. A group of 276 Italian students from primary and middle school (aged 8–15) completed self-reports assessing moral disengagement, socio-conventional perception of moral rules, and participation in bullying as bully, defender of the victim and passive bystander. Results from structural equation modeling analysis confirmed that moral disengagement and socio-conventional comprehension of aggressions are separate and moderately connected morality dimensions. Controlling for age, gender and SES, only moral disengagement was positively associated with perpetrating bullying. These results point to moral disengagement as the critical component of moral cognitions to be addressed in interventions.

Highlights

Research has devoted considerable attention to processes explaining the associations between moral cognitions and bullying behavior, and two theoretical perspectives on morality have been mainly used: (i) using mechanisms of self-justification that allow the person to act in an aggressive way without feeling guilty by cognitively restructuring the situation, namely moral disengagement (Bandura, 1991); (ii) judging moral rules forbidding to harm others as breakable because of a wrong conception of them as dependent on the authorities’ statements, and, by consequence as non-worthy by themselves, so that their transgression can be accepted.There is evidence that bullying perpetrators can evaluate bullying as wrong (Gasser and Keller, 2009); they bully peers
Our findings confirmed that moral disengagement mechanisms and the socio-conventional perception of aggressions are distinct dimensions of morality, only moderately associated
Moral disengagement was associated with higher perpetration of bullying and with lower defending

Summary

Introduction

There is evidence that bullying perpetrators can evaluate bullying as wrong (Gasser and Keller, 2009); they bully peers Both the social domain and the moral disengagement theories provide some explanation of this gap between the moral evaluation and the actual perpetration of bullying. The phenomenon of the moral domain shift (Leenders and Brugman, 2005) suggests the possibility of their inter-connection If they may relate to each other, they may relate differently to forms of participation in bullying when they are considered in the same framework. In this study we aim to contribute to fill in this gap in the literature, by investigating to what extent these two types of moral knowledge are related to each other and to forms of participation in bullying, in order to further light on the organization of moral mechanisms in relation to social behaviors

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