Two deductions of right in early post-Kantianism

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper uses a distinction drawn from the Kantian legal theorist Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach to categorize two approaches to analysing the concept of right, each of which is represented by various figures in early post-Kantianism. Feuerbach’s distinction holds that there were two main strategies for conceiving of the relation between right and morality and the structure of rights. He refers to these two conceptions as ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ deductions from the moral law. One key contribution of my paper consists of the reconstruction of historical examples of each kind of argument, along with some ‘hybrid’ accounts. Figures discussed include Feuerbach, Heydenreich, Reinhold, Fichte, Hufeland, and Erhard. In light of this historical reconstructive work, I argue that Fichte’s 1796 arguments against absolute deductions face a previously unnoticed dilemma: either the arguments assume a premise I will call the mere permissions principle, which causes tension with a central commitment of Fichte’s theory of property in FNR; or the arguments do not assume the mere permissions principle, in which case they are not sufficient to rule out the possibility of hybrid views that give a more limited role to absolute moral rights.