Abstract
“Two Concepts of Realization, Mental Causation, and Physicalism” compares and evaluates two accounts of realization, the standard second‐order account and Sydney Shoemaker's new “subset” account. According to the standard account, a property realizes another just in case it fills the causal role that defines the realized property. On the subset account, a property realizes another if and only if its causal powers include the causal powers of the realized property as a subset. In his recent book Physical Realization (2007), Shoemaker uses this subset account to vindicate mental causation within nonreductive physicalism. The essay argues that Shoemaker's attempt does not succeed, and that the physicalist framework he defends is best viewed as a form of type physicalism, not nonreductive physicalism.
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