Abstract
Abstract The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.
Highlights
The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled
The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception
It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken
Summary
Over the last few years, John McDowell has developed an influential conception of second nature in several papers and in his path-breaking book, Mind and World. McDowell articulates the fundamental idea motivating the concept of second nature as follows: “The idea is that the dictates of reason are there anyway, whether or not one’s eyes are opened to them...”[8] Expressing this idea programmatically, he writes: “We are looking for a conception of our nature that includes a capacity to resonate to the structure of the space of reasons.”[9] Second nature is the name for a concept that adheres to what I call the preceding principle This requires asking how human beings can be receptive to a conceptually structured reality in the first place. McDowell answers this question with the initiation principle (2): Processes of education are essential for acquiring second nature Through these processes, individual human beings acquire the capacities to receive conceptual structures. The realm of conceptuality is, in McDowell’s words, unbounded
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