Two arguments against ethical egoism

Abstract

The form of ethical egoism which I shall discuss is the view that the right thing for anyone to do, on any occasion, is whatever would best promote his own interests, no matter how other people's interests would be affected. Very few philosophers who write books or publish articles in journals believe in this doctrine, although many are at pains to refute it. There are at least three interconnected reasons for wanting to refute this view: first, it is a pernicious doctrine which goes against some of our most central moral beliefs. According to ethical egoism, each of us should take the att i tude that other people simply don ' t matter, except insofar as they are useful to us; and that is a wicked attitude. Second, even though few philosophers accept the doctrine, many people are tempted by it. Moreover and this is perhaps the most important reason, from a philosophical point of view the refutation is bound to shed some light on the rationale behind the alternative view that other people's interests should be respected for their own sakes. Some philosophers have argued that ethical egoism is unacceptable because it violates principles of logic which every rational person must accept) I am going to present two arguments against ethical egoism, but neither of them is of this type. I will not try to show that egoism is self-contradictory. Rather, I will argue that even if ethical egoism is a logically consistent doctrine, it is unacceptable on other