Abstract
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the key causes and effects of The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997-99 and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09. Drawing on existing financial crisis scholarship, the author finds that weak institutions, speculative attacks and political corruption were accelerants of the AFC and GFC, but not root causes. The author finds evidence that, as with the Global Financial Crisis, the most important factors were (a) the rapid accumulation of credit and an asset price boom in the lead-up to a banking crisis, (b) a consequent sharp deterioration of asset values through a leverage downswing, (c) the impact of a leverage downswing on securities markets and financial institutions at systemically important junctures within under- and unregulated frontiers, and (d) credit and liquidity crunches that froze capital allocation. These patterns offer lessons about common themes across financial crises, and recommend several areas that may be the subject of continued research.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
