Twentieth‐Century Continental Ethics

Abstract

Abstract There have been at least four major movements in twentieth‐century Continental ethics: value realism; intersubjectivity theories; personal transformation theories; and “anti‐morality, creative‐response theories.” Value realism emerged from phenomenological investigations of the experience of value; it highlights the relationships among emotions and value. Its central figures include Brentano, Scheler, and Hartmann. Intersubjectivity theories are rooted in theories of recognition in Fichte and Hegel; they suggest that an entirely new ethical dimension emerges from the interweave of human reciprocity. Major exponents include Buber, Levinas, and Habermas. Personal transformation theories elaborate and refine self‐realization approaches that are central to Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche; they ground ethics in the analysis of the human condition. Paradigm contributors include Sartre and Foucault. Finally, anti‐morality theories develop Nietzsche's harsh critique of morality – narrowly conceived, while creative response theories attempt to ground ethics in fidelity to specific, developing, significant events. Exemplary figures include Bergson and Badiou. All four movements provide grounds for ethics that differ from traditional emphases on consequences and/or duties. Below I explore some reasons for this tradition's rejection of those standard approaches.