Abstract

ABSTRACT By concentrating on the period 1933–1940, this paper argues that Turkey’s decision to opt for neutrality during the Second World War was not part of a calculated long run strategy, but a abrupt reaction to the unexpected fall of France in the summer of 1940. To explain and expand these proposals, the paper summarizes Turkey’s economic relations with Britain and Germany during the 1930s and the state of its armed forces. This is followed by a discussion of the basic strategic ideas of both sides, and the military planning which preceded the signature of the tripartite alliance treaty between Britain, France and Turkey in October 1939. It closes with an outline of the collapse of the treaty in 1940, with an analysis of its serious weaknesses and their causes.

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