Tsar Alexander III and the Boulanger Crisis in France

Abstract

T HE Erise of General Georges Boulanger in France in the late eighteeneighties was of more than domestic import. Challenging Germany's position, it produced immediate and farreaching repercussions on the international stage. As a result, it affected Russia too, both domestically and externally, and confronted the Russian government with serious political problems; in fact, the impact of the Boulangist movement on Russia revealed fundamental weaknesses of the tsarist autocracy. Alexander III, who disapproved of the general, found it impossible or inadvisable to suppress the enthusiastic support which Boulanger soon came to enjoy in many Russian circles. His inability to control public opinion was all the more significant as the support given to Boulanger bore implications of a growing opposition to the tsarist regime. Boulanger became a factor of political importance at a time when Russo-German relations had reached a stage of considerable tension. During the summer of I885 a political crisis in Bulgaria had led to the incorporation of Eastern Rumelia into Bulgaria. This step, taken without St. Petersburg's approval, was quickly interpreted by many Russians as but another attempt of Austria, and indirectly of Germany, to reduce Russia's position in the Balkan peninsula. A Belgian diplomat observed at the time: the incidents in Bulgaria Russia feels ... that the Three Emperors' League is paralyzing her policy in the Balkan peninsula. Relations between the three imperial courts remain satisfactory to all outward appearances, but the Russian press is free to proclaim its pan-Slav aspirations and its unfriendly attitude toward Germany, and especially Austria.... It does not conceal its inclination toward a Franco-Russian alliance.' Unwittingly, the report summed up the nature of Russia's problem. The Bulgarian crisis was not irremediable. Since Bismarck's policy revolved around a good relationship with Russia, he was anxious to find a solution acceptable to St. Petersburg. At his request Austria likewise prepared to adopt a conciliatory attitude.2 In Russia, however, pan-Slav circles seized eagerly upon this opportunity to urge the country to change sides and leave the Austro-German camp for a rapprochement with France. It was not their first effort. Ever since Germany. had failed to support Russia's claims at the Congress of Berlin in I878, most pan-Slavs had seen in her an obstacle which had to be removed if Russia was to occupy her rightful place in Europe. As early as I882 General Michael Skobelev, one of their most prominent leaders, had called for a more aggressive