Abstract

Do democratic political regimes facilitate more robust environmental and natural resource regulatory policies? Yes, in many cases. Using detailed cases of natural resource policy making in Thailand, however, we find that neither political parties nor civil society nor state institutions do well in representing diffuse interests, mediating among conflicting ones or defining compromises and securing their acceptance by most key players. Gains in environmental or natural resource policy making have not been dramatically more likely under democratic regimes than under “liberal authoritarian” ones with broad freedoms of speech and association. We argue that Thailand's democratic political system features weak linkages between groups in society and political parties, lacks alternative encompassing or brokering institutions in civil society, and that these features account for a tendency for political democracy to fail to deliver on its policy potential in Thailand.

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