Abstract
Chapter 9 claimed that a way to preserve ideas about truth-making is to think of truth differently for different sorts of claims. However, what, exactly is the connection between theories of truth and truth-making? This chapter considers this issue in detail, and argues that the notion of truth-making only makes sense in the context of views about the nature of truth. It is argued that some stance on the nature of truth is a necessary prerequisite of a theory of truth-making. This causes problems for any theorist who wishes to combine a theory of truth-making with a deflationary or a primitivist approach to truth. The central idea here is that theories of truth-making do not make theories of the nature of truth obsolete. Instead, as we will see, they give another demonstration of the paramount importance of metaphysical investigations into the nature of truth.
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