Abstract
In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over-emphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic.
Highlights
Truth and ThinkingThe fundamental aim of education, like that of science, is the promotion of knowledge [i.e. true belief]
Despite both the central importance of education in the work of many of the major figures of the Western philosophical tradition, and the deep philosophical issues raised by the practice of education, philosophy of education has not always been regarded by contemporary philosophers as an important, or even a legitimate, area of philosophy.1 As he has done on many other philosophical fronts, Alvin Goldman has challenged this conventional view by paying considerable attention to education in his recent work on social epistemology
Though, is the key notion of veritistic (i.e. truth-linked) social epistemology (VSE), and its key question is: which social processes help us in the pursuit of knowledge, i.e. true belief? In the book he examines a wide range of social practices – both ‘generic’ practices involving testimony, argumentation, communication, and speech regulation, and practices in the specific domains of science, law, democracy, and education – always focusing on the extent to which these practices conduce to true belief
Summary
The fundamental aim of education, like that of science, is the promotion of knowledge [i.e. true belief]. We want them to be reflective, but in addition to be disposed to base their beliefs upon reasons and evidence, to seek out reasons for candidate beliefs, to be open to both others’ criticisms of their own beliefs and to others’ contrary beliefs, to take seriously the reasons and points of view of others, and so on While these can be seen by the veritist to be in service to the truth, and so compatible with veritism – which they are – it is important to see that these have moral dimensions (involving respect for others, intellectual modesty and humility, etc.), and that these latter dispositions and traits can be justified independently of considerations of truth. If the arguments above have merit, such thinking has epistemic value independently of its tie to truth It is valuable in light of its place in the enhancement of autonomy and the fostering of dispositions and traits of character – matters which are themselves educationally fundamental, but which extend far beyond education’s concern with the promotion of true belief. It is critical or rational thinking, rather than truth, that is educationally fundamental
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