Abstract
Some say the swamping problem confronts all who believe that true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value (“T-Monism”, to use Duncan Pritchard's term). This, I say, is mistaken. The problem only confronts T-Monists if they grant two teleological claims: (i) that all derived epistemic value is instrumental, and (ii) that it is the state of believing truly rather than the standard of truth in belief that is fundamentally epistemically valuable. T-Monists should reject (i) and (ii), and appeal to a non-teleological form of value derivation I call Fitting Response Derivation that obviates swamping. Since, alas, simple reliabilists can't apply this model to knowledge, the problem remains for them, and is local
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