Abstract

The chief problem about semantics comes at the beginning.1 What is the theory of meaning a theory of? What are the facts that it is supposed to account for? As the variety of recent and contemporary work in linguistic semantics will attest, the answers to these questions exert a mighty influence on subsequent theory. I won't canvass this variety here, but call attention to a line of reasoning that seems to me attractive, and in harmony with semantic theory as it is actually practiced, if not always with the interpretation of that practice. Consider the simplest possible answer to our question, namely that the theory of meaning is charged with accounting for facts about meaning. The notion of meaning is at least initially given in our everyday vocabulary: we speak of people knowing the meaning of something, or not knowing it, of their failure to appreciate the full meaning of something, and of what certain signs mean in such-and-such conventional systems. Moreover, it is not difficult in practice to

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