Abstract

Are all instances of the T‐schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule‐based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth‐conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It follows that the semantic content of a sentence is not given simply by its truth‐conditional content. So not all instances of the T‐schema are assertable in the relevant sense. Consequently, there is a strong case to be made against truth‐conditional semantics of the disquotational variety and deflationism about truth.

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